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Many of the most pernicious economic institutions and policies create entry barriers or manipulate
factor prices to transfer resources from entrepreneurs and workers to groups that hold political power.
These inefficiencies partly result from the fact that direct and efficient fiscal instruments that can be
used for taxation and redistribution of resources are absent. One might then conclude that increasing
state capacity and expanding the set of available fiscal instruments should improve the allocation of
resources by preventing the use of these inefficient, indirect methods of redistribution. This reasoning
ignores the effect of greater state capacity and the change in the set of available fiscal instruments
on the political equilibrium, however. Because the availability of more efficient means of taxation
increases the potential benefits of controlling state power, it also intensifies costly political conflict
aimed at capturing the control of the state. This indirect effect counteracts the benefits from more efficient
taxation and may dominate the direct benefits. The paper establishes the possibility that the allocation
of resources may deteriorate substantially in response to an autonomous increase in state capacity
and the set of fiscal instruments. It also argues that in the British case, which is a key historical example
that points to the central role of increased state capacity in economic development, this change was
not autonomous; instead, it was an equilibrium response to changes in political institutions that placed
better checks on the exercise of power by the executive. This reasoning suggests that the study of the
effect of fiscal capacity and the evaluation of policies aimed at increasing state capacity in less-developed
economies should be done in the context of dynamic models of political economy, in which fiscal









While in a few societies economic institutions are designed to provide property rights
protection, a level playing ￿eld, and basic public goods necessary for economic growth,
in many they are structured to maximize the rents captured by the ￿elite,￿the indi-
viduals or social groups monopolizing political power (e.g., Douglass C. North, 1981,
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2005, North, John J. Wallis and
Barry R. Weingast, 2009, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). The elite often choose en-
try barriers, regulations and ine¢ cient contracting institutions that retard economic
growth and create resource misallocations in order to protect their economic rents and
redistribute resources to themselves (e.g., Mancur Olson, 1982, Per Krusell and Jose-
Victor Rios-Rull, 1996, Stephen Parente and Edward J. Prescott, 1999).1 However,
if resources could be redistributed to the elite with fewer distortions, a more e¢ cient
allocation of resources, with (part of) the proceeds accruing to the elite, could be
chosen. For example, when the necessary ￿scal instruments and the associated state
capacity are absent, the elite may choose economic institutions and policies so as to
redistribute income to themselves by reducing the productivity of competing groups
and thus manipulating factor prices (Acemoglu, 2007). Direct taxation, if feasible,
would be both more e¢ cient and more pro￿table for the elite.
This reasoning suggests that when the state becomes more ￿developed,￿achieves
greater ￿capacity,￿and has access to a larger set of ￿scal instruments, there will be
less need for such ine¢ cient, indirect methods of redistribution and the allocation of
resources will improve (e.g., Acemoglu, 2007, Timothy J. Besley and Torsten Persson,
2010). The example of the development of the English state and economy in the 18th
century is often used to support this presumption.
1A second, perhaps more important reason is that the elite may be afraid that a more e¢ cient
allocation of resources will reduce their political power and their future ability to obtain rents (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006).
1This paper points out that, in contrast to this argument, the availability of more
e¢ cient means of taxation is a double-edged sword because of its impact on the po-
litical equilibrium; because more e¢ cient means of taxation increase the potential
bene￿ts of controlling the state, they may also intensify political con￿ ict aimed at
capturing this control. This indirect e⁄ect counteracts the bene￿ts from more e¢ -
cient taxation and may dominate the direct e⁄ect, so that the allocation of resources
may deteriorate when the society and the state have access to additional ￿scal in-
struments. More generally, although greater state capacity and stronger states may
bring a variety of economic bene￿ts, they will also increase the value of controlling
the state and thus induce increased political con￿ ict and in￿ghting. Therefore, the
virtues of strong states emerge when the increase in the economic strength of the
state is a consequence of, or coincident with, an increase in the political accountabil-
ity of rulers and politicians￿ not necessarily when there is an autonomous increase
in the ￿scal capacity of the state. This view is in fact more consistent with promi-
nent historical examples (from England and elsewhere), which show that increases in
the ￿scal capacity of the state have typically been concomitant with increases in its
accountability (e.g., Brewer, 1988).
I use a simple model to exposit these ideas. I start with a simpli￿ed version of
Acemoglu (2007), with two additional features. First, instead of a single group of
elites (in addition to the middle class and workers), there are now two groups of
competing elites. Second, these two groups can engage in a costly contest in order
to capture state power. I provide an example in which without e¢ cient taxation
mechanisms, the group in power uses ine¢ cient entry barriers to manipulate factor
prices. The availability of tax instruments avoids this source of ine¢ ciency in the
allocation of resources. However, I also show that these tax instruments increase the
costs expended in order to capture the control of the state and this may more than
2o⁄set the bene￿ts.
Naturally, these results do not imply that the increased power of the state and the
availability of a richer set of ￿scal instruments lead to a worse allocation of resources,
since these changes often occur endogenously in response to better political controls￿
so that the elite are unable to use these instruments to extract greater resources from
the rest of the society. This paper therefore suggests that it is important to study the
development of the power of the state as part of a process in which better political
institutions are built in order to control the exercise of power.
The main idea proposed in this paper is closely related to Wilson (1990) and
Becker and Mulligan (1998), who suggest that politicians might want to commit to
use ine¢ cient methods in order to reduce total redistribution. The main di⁄erence is
that in the current paper the potential costs of e¢ cient methods of redistribution are
not simply greater redistribution, but the waste created in a power struggle in order
to capture the now more valuable control of the state.
2 Economic Model
Consider a static and simpli￿ed version of the model presented in Acemoglu (2007).
The economy is populated by a continuum L+2￿e+￿m of risk neutral agents. Agents
are in four groups. The ￿rst comprises a total mass L of workers, who supply labor
inelastically. The second is a total population ￿
m of ￿middle class￿agents, denoted
by m, and ￿nally, there are two sets of potentially competing elites, denoted by 1 and
2. For simplicity, let us assume that each of these two groups has size ￿
e, normalized
to ￿
e = 1. Middle-class and elite agents (of either group) can become entrepreneurs.
Each entrepreneur can hire at most ￿ workers. The productivity of each middle class
agent is Am, while the productivity of elite agents of groups 1 and 2 are both given
3by Ae.2 Throughout, let us focus on the more relevant case where the middle class
are more productive than the elite, i.e.,
(A1) 0 < A
e ￿ A
m:
I assume that the elite group 1 initially controls the state. One policy tool available
to the state is an entry barrier Bm a⁄ecting middle-class agents wishing to become
entrepreneurs (hire labor). These entry barriers are purely wasteful and generate
no revenues (whether there are also additional entry barriers applying to the other
elite group has no e⁄ect on the results). In addition, they may also have access to a
non-distortionary income tax, ￿. Since there is no marginal decision, such as labor
supply or capital investment, this income tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. Tax
revenues, if any, are redistributed lump-sum and in a group-speci￿c manner, so that
all the proceeds could be redistributed to the group in power.
The key economic margin in this model is the allocation of labor to di⁄erent
entrepreneurs. In particular, denoting the set of entrepreneurs by S, labor market
clearing requires
R
j2S ljdj ￿ L, where lj denotes the labor hired by entrepreneur j,
and with a slight abuse of notation, I also use lm and le for the employment levels of
middle-class and elite entrepreneurs.
Let us also assume
(A2) 2￿





which, combined with (A1) and the fact that each entrepreneur can employ ￿ workers,
implies that there is a su¢ cient number of middle-class entrepreneurs to employ all
workers, but there will not be ￿excess demand￿for labor coming only from the two
2Allowing these productivities to be di⁄erent, Ae
1 and Ae
2, would have no e⁄ect on the results.
4groups of elites.
Given this description, the structure of economic equilibrium is straightforward.
When the wage rate is w and the entry barrier on middle-class entrepreneurs is Bm,







In contrast, each elite entrepreneur will make a pro￿t of ￿e (w) = (Ae ￿ w)le. The
equilibrium wage rate has to be such that the labor market clearing condition is met.
Then in view of (A1) and (A2), the equilibrium will involve
(1) w = maxfA
m ￿ B
m=￿;0g;
since the marginal entrepreneur will always be from the middle class. In particular,
if there are no entry barriers (Bm = 0), then the equilibrium wage is simply w = Am
due to competition among middle-class entrepreneurs. If there are positive entry
barriers (Bm > 0), then each active middle-class entrepreneur will be at capacity and
will have to make zero pro￿ts, which gives (1).
3 Equilibrium Policies
Let us next turn to equilibrium policies. Suppose that elite group 1 is in power. Let
us also ￿rst assume that there are no ￿scal instruments and thus the only available
policy instrument is entry barriers. Given the above description of the economic
equilibrium, it is clear that with Bm = 0, the elite will make zero pro￿ts. In contrast,
by choosing Bm ￿ ￿Am, they can ensure that they become entrepreneurs and also
push the equilibrium wage rate down to zero￿ i.e., manipulate factor prices. In this
5case, each elite agent (of either group) will have an income of ￿Ae > 0. Therefore,
the equilibrium choice of policies will involve a ￿misallocation of resources￿induced
by entry barriers chosen by the elite. Total (net) output in the economy would be




since either only the elite are entrepreneurs or if the middle class enter (with Bm =
￿Am), all of their production is wasted on entry costs. If, in contrast, we had Bm = 0
(and thus w = Am), total net output would be
(3) ^ Y = A
mL > Y:
Next, suppose that the elite in power, elite group 1, have access to income taxes.
Then they can set Bm = 0, allow the middle class to become entrepreneurs, and set
100% taxation to redistribute all income to themselves. Assuming that the proceeds
are redistributed equally among the members of the elite group in power, each member
will have an income of AmL > ￿Ae (where the inequality follows immediately from
(A1) and (A2)). In this case, total output is ^ Y as given by (3) and the allocation of
resources resulting from factor price manipulation disappears. This is the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of what Acemoglu (2007) refers to as greater ￿state capacity￿or what Besley
and Persson (2009) refer to as ￿the genius of taxation￿ . However, this ignores the
e⁄ect of changes in the set of ￿scal instruments on the political equilibrium.
4 Political Equilibrium
Let us next endogenize the political equilibrium, meaning the allocation of political
power. To do this in the simplest possible way, suppose that only the two elite groups
6can compete for power and use a contest function to represent this competition (e.g.,
Avinash K. Dixit, 1987). This competition takes place before the choice of policies
and the determination of the economic equilibrium. Each elite group j 2 f1;2g








where ￿ ￿ 2. These expenditures are pure waste (just as resources spent on entry
when there are entry barriers), and let us also assume that both elite groups have deep
pockets to meet these expenditures. These modeling assumptions capture, albeit in
a reduced-form manner, any kind of costly con￿ ict to control political power between
di⁄erent social groups.
Then elite group j 2 f1;2g will choose xj (taking x￿j as given) as a solution to

















Vj (￿j) ￿ xj;
where Vj (j) and Vj (￿j) denote the value of a representative member of group j
when, respectively, its group or the other group is in power.
First consider the political equilibrium without the tax instruments. In this case,
members of both elite groups have income ￿Ae regardless of which of group is in
power, i.e., Vj (j) = Vj (￿j) = ￿Ae. Thus, the equilibrium involves x1 = x2 = 0, and
net output is still Y , given by (2).
Next suppose that additional tax instruments are available. Then the group in
power can choose these taxes to redistribute all of the income generated in the econ-
omy to itself (including the income of the other elite group), so Vj (j) = ^ Y as given
by (3) and Vj (￿j) = 0. Using these expressions, (4) and the fact that ￿ ￿ 2, we can









Therefore, net output in this case, after the wasteful contest spending is subtracted,
is




with again ^ Y given by (3). Even though ^ Y > Y , there is no guarantee that ~ Y ￿ Y .
For example, if Am is close to Ae, ￿ is close to 1, and ￿ ￿ 1, we will necessarily have
~ Y < Y . In fact, equation (6) implies that ~ Y can be arbitrarily small relative to Y .
Consequently, an extended set of ￿scal instruments potentially improves the alloca-
tion of resources, in particular, preventing the need for manipulating factor prices;
however, the increased rents that they imply for those controlling power intensify
costly political con￿ ict, which can more than o⁄set the direct economic gains.
5 The Virtues of Strong States
John Brewer (1988) documents the rise of the strong state in Britain in the 18th cen-
tury. The 18th-century, and then subsequently 19th-century, British state could both
spend and regulate more, and also had access to a larger set of tax instruments and
to a wider tax base. Yet, the expansion of the ￿scal powers was not an autonomous
process, but a consequence of the Glorious Revolution, which increased the checks
against the actions of the state and the arbitrary behavior of rulers and politicians.










the two ￿rst-order conditions (and noting that Vj (j) = V￿j (￿j) = ^ Y ) immediately gives x￿j = xj,
which solves uniquely for (5), and veri￿es the second-order condition.
8The British tax revenues increased by over three fold in the quarter of a century fol-
lowing the Glorious Revolution (while French revenues remained constant). Notably,
these revenues were used very di⁄erently from how the marginal revenue was spent
during the reign of the Stuarts before 1688: instead of ￿nancing the consumption
or the retinue of the crown, they were spent to strengthen the Navy, which would
then play an important role in defending the overseas interests of those in the Parlia-
ment (who in fact constituted the main checks against the power of the Hanoverian
monarchs). Brewer documents why the development of the capacity of the state was
important for British economic development.
The story, therefore, is not one of an ￿autonomous￿or exogenous development of
state capacity leading to a better allocation of resources in the economy. Instead, it is
one of simultaneous improvements in political institutions constraining the arbitrary
power of the state and rulers and a remarkable increase in the economic power of
the state (its powers to tax, spend and regulate). In fact, in the British case, it
appears that the increase in the economic strength of the state was a consequence of
the political developments emanating from the Glorious Revolution. What we have
here, therefore, is much more reminiscent to what I referred to in Acemoglu (2005)
as a ￿consensually strong state￿in the sense that the state is endogenously becoming
stronger with the consent of citizens; citizens (or in the British case, the merchants,
gentry and some aristocrats) gave this consent precisely because they knew that they
could rein in the power of the state if it deviates signi￿cantly from the course of action
that they would like to see implemented.
In terms of the model presented here, we could easily incorporate this feature in
a reduced-form way by introducing constraints on the elite in power.4 Suppose, for
example, that only a fraction ￿ of tax revenues can be redistributed directly to the
4See Acemoglu (2005) for a dynamic model.
9group in power, while the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ has to be redistributed as a lump-sum
transfer to the entire population. The analysis in Section III is a special case when
￿ = 1. Then repeating the same exercise as above, we can see that as ￿ declines, so
that political checks on the elite in power are strengthened, there will be less in￿ghting
in order to control the state, and for ￿ su¢ ciently small, the availability of additional
tax instruments will necessarily increase net output.
6 Concluding Comments
Many of the most pernicious economic institutions and policies create entry barriers
or manipulate factor prices indirectly to transfer resources from entrepreneurs and
workers to groups that hold political power. These ine¢ ciencies partly result from
the fact that direct and e¢ cient ￿scal instruments to transfer resources from the
former to the latter groups are absent. This reasoning suggests that increasing state
capacity and expanding the set of available ￿scal instruments should redress (some
of) these ine¢ ciencies and induce a better allocation of resources.
This paper points out why this argument needs to be quali￿ed and why caution
is necessary before increasing the ￿scal capacity of the state becomes a silver bullet
policy recommendation. Because the availability of more e¢ cient means of taxation
increases the potential bene￿ts of controlling state power, it also intensi￿es political
con￿ ict aimed at capturing the control of the state. This indirect e⁄ect counteracts
the bene￿ts from more e¢ cient taxation and may dominate these direct bene￿ts; as
a consequence, the allocation of resources may deteriorate when the society and the
state have access to additional ￿scal instruments.
The more general lesson is that while state capacity and states with su¢ cient
economic strength to tax, regulate and provide public goods are essential for economic
10development, these bene￿ts may not get realized by an autonomous increase in the
strength of the state because this will also increase the value of controlling the state
and thus induce increased political con￿ ict and in￿ghting. Therefore, the virtues of
strong states emerge when the increase in the economic strength of the state is a
consequence of, or at least happens simultaneously with, an increase in the political
accountability of rulers and politicians. This underscores the need for future work
investigating dynamic models of the endogenous emergence of state capacity and its
relationship to political accountability.
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